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Abstract Corporations across the world are highly inter-
connected in a large global network of corporate control.
This paper investigates the global board interlock network,
covering 400,000 firms linked through 1,700,000 edges
representing shared directors between these firms. The
main focus is on the concept of centrality, which is used to
investigate the embeddedness of firms from a particular
country within the global network. The study results in
three contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge for
the first time we can investigate the topology as well as the
concept of centrality in corporate networks at a global
scale, allowing for the largest cross-country comparison
ever done in interlocking directorates literature. We
demonstrate, among other things, extremely similar net-
work topologies, yet large differences between countries
when it comes to the relation between economic promi-
nence indicators and firm centrality. Second, we introduce
two new metrics that are specifically suitable for compar-
ing the centrality ranking of a partition to that of the full
network. Using the notion of centrality persistence we
propose to measure the persistence of a partition’s cen-
trality ranking in the full network. In the board interlock
network, it allows us to assess the extent to which the
footprint of a national network is still present within the
global network. Next, the measure of centrality ranking
dominance tells us whether a partition (country) is more
dominant at the top or the bottom of the centrality ranking
of the full (global) network. Finally, comparing these two
new measures of persistence and dominance between dif-
ferent countries allows us to classify these countries based
the their embeddedness, measured using the relation
between the centrality of a country’s firms on the national
and the global scale of the board interlock network.
Keywords Centrality  Large-scale network analysis 
Corporate networks  Interlocking directorates
1 Introduction
Although often depicted as atomistic and individualistic
market actors, corporations are tightly embedded in net-
works of power and control. Foundational elements of
these networks are interlocking directorates, where officers
of one firm also serve on the board of another firm.
Increasingly, these hitherto national business communities’
networks now form a global network of corporate control
(Heemskerk et al. 2016a; Heemskerk and Takes 2016;
Heemskerk et al. 2016b; Kogut 2012; Vitali et al. 2011).
We refer to this structure of interlocking directorates as the
global board interlock network, which is in fact an undi-
rected network (graph) consisting of firms (nodes) and
particular relationships (edges) between these firms. Two
firms are connected if they share a common senior level
director, officer or board member, essentially modeling the
social ties that exist between firms. Our global corporate
network is based on nearly 400,000 firms and more than
1,700,000 board interlock ties between firms. A geo-
graphical visualization of this network is given in Fig. 1,
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illustrating the dense interconnectedness of our global
economy through board interlocks.
A network modeling approach allows the use of existing
metrics and techniques for analyzing and mining networks
that have been suggested for a range of real-world net-
works (Takes 2014). It turns out that the structure of the
considered global corporate network has a power-law
degree distribution, meaning that the number of nodes with
very few connections is large, whereas there are a smaller
number of hub-like nodes with a very high degree. More-
over, nodes cluster together, forming a larger than random
number of closed triangles of connections. Despite the low
density of the network, the average distance (number of
hops) between two nodes is relatively low, altogether
referred to as the small world property (Kleinberg 2000;
Kogut 2012). This paper focuses on centrality measures,
techniques commonly employed in small world networks
for assessing the importance of a node with respect to the
other nodes, based on the structure of the network. Well-
known examples of such measures that originate from the
field of social network analysis are degree centrality,
eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality and between-
ness centrality (Borgatti and Everett 2006; Brandes and
Pich 2007).
Networks of interlocking directorates have been studied
for over 100 years, and there is an extensive body of the
literature discussing the causes and consequences of board
interlocks, see for example the excellent overview in
Mizruchi (1996). In board interlock networks, node (firm)
centrality is widely considered as an indication of a pow-
erful or at least advantageous position (Pfeffer and Salan-
cik 1978; Stokman et al. 1985). An extensive body of the
literature discusses the relationship between the economic
performance of a firm and centrality (Andres et al. 2013;
Croci and Grassi 2014; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Larcker
et al. 2013; Mariolis and Jones 1982). However, this lit-
erature has found diverse outcomes in different countries
when it comes to the precise relation between centrality
and firm performance. We adopt the argument that the
ordering of the nodes determined by a centrality measure is
an indicator of the economic order of power. Given that
powerful firms are typically larger players in the economy,
a comparison of centrality with an economic performance
indicator may give us some indication as to which cen-
trality measure is most representative for finding powerful
actors in the global corporate network. So, in the global
corporate network, we say that centrality gives an indica-
tion of the importance of a firm within the global system of
corporate control.
Although globalization has led to a worldwide con-
nected network of firms, if a standard hierarchical com-
munity detection algorithm (to detect groups of nodes that
are more connected with each other than with the rest of
the network) is applied to the global corporate network, the
resulting communities have a clear regional character
(Heemskerk and Takes 2016; Heemskerk et al. 2016b). In
line with earlier studies (Carroll and Fennema 2002), this
reveals that the footprint of the national networks is still
visible in the global network. The fact that the global
network is actually comprised of multiple smaller national
networks indicates a so-called multi-level structure (Kivela¨
et al. 2014; Lazega and Snijders 2015). This has important
implications for the use of centrality as an indicator of firm
prominence.
First, firms have a certain central or less central position
within the entire (global) network, but also within the
partition of their respective national network. And these
two may very well differ: a firm can be central in a national
network but relatively peripheral in the global network. A
key methodological question addressed in this paper is
therefore how centrality measures can be interpreted,
compared and understood on the various global and
national scales of the network using quantitative measures.
A comparison between local and global centrality rankings
Fig. 1 Geographical
visualization of the global board
interlock network, consisting of
around 400,000 firms and over
1,700,000 board interlocks.
Visualized using Gephi (http://
gephi.org)
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is far from trivial, firstly because the rankings that we
compare are not of equal length, and second because one
(the national) ranking’s nodes are always included in the
other (global) ranking. We will survey existing metrics for
comparing centrality rankings and propose two new
methods to compare such rankings in Sect. 4. The goal of
these new metrics is to provide additional insight in how
power and control at the national level of a country’s
corporate network is persistent and dominant at the global
level.
Second, as a result of the aforementioned multi-level
structure we may be interested in how certain sets of firms,
for instance those that are domiciled within a particular
country, are embedded in the global network. For this we
will look at the differences between local and global cen-
trality measures, as it provides insight in how the consid-
ered partition (national network) is embedded in the full
network (globally). So, in addition to comparing descrip-
tive static topological network properties between coun-
tries, as is also done for example in Burris and Staples
(2012), we attempt to better understand the embeddedness
of countries in the global corporate network based on the
relation between local and global centrality.
The three contributions of this paper are as follows.
First and foremost, we discuss, compare, propose and
evaluate existing as well as two new methods for quan-
titatively comparing centrality rankings at multiple scales
of a network, such as the global and national scales in the
considered corporate networks. Second, we conduct a
cross-country comparison, comparing the topology of the
global network to and between various national networks,
including an analysis of how centrality relates to eco-
nomic prominence indicators at the local and global
scale. Third, using the newly proposed metrics and the
insight in the local topologies, we are able to quantita-
tively compare, classify and rank countries based on their
position within the network structure of the global eco-
nomic order.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
After discussing related work in Sects. 2, 3 formally
defines the considered corporate network at a local and a
global scale. It furthermore gives a short review of the
various centrality measures that we consider, before dis-
cussing and proposing various ways of comparing them at
different levels of the network in Sect. 4. Next, the topol-
ogy of our global corporate network dataset as well as the
various national networks are investigated in Sect. 5. We
apply centrality measures to our board interlock network in
Sect. 6, specifically to better understand differences
between centrality within the national networks and the
global network. To do so, we experiment with the new
comparison metrics proposed in the preceding section,
using the obtained results to conduct an in-depth cross-
country comparison. Finally, conclusions and suggestions
for future work are given in Sect. 7.
2 Related work
In this section we briefly survey the literature on the
analysis of corporate networks and board interlock net-
works, as well as related work on centrality measures and
means of comparing them. Finally, we discuss the literature
that deals with applying centrality specifically to board
interlock networks.
Apart from interlocking directorates, corporate net-
works can model relationships between firms based on a
number of different types of ties, including trade (Wilhite
2001), borrowing and lending of money (Battiston et al.
2016) and ownership, creating a network in which two
firms are linked if one firm owns a certain percentage of
another firm (Vitali and Battiston 2014; Vitali et al. 2011).
In corporate networks, community detection algorithms, to
find groups of firms that are more connected with each
other than with the rest of the network, are frequently
applied (Heemskerk and Takes 2016; Piccardi et al. 2010;
Vitali and Battiston 2014). For both board interlock as well
as ownership networks, it has been suggested that the
communities that arise from the global corporate network
have a clear regional character.
Interlocking directorates, i.e., the fact that a person sits
on two or more corporate boards, are of great interest to
scholars from a variety of disciplines, including political
science, sociology, business administration, and more
recently, network science. Together, interlocking boards
connect the top decision-making bodies of our economies
in a ‘‘social’’ corporate network. These networks have been
an object of study for over 100 years, dating back to the
early twentieth century, featuring the 1905 study by Jeidels
(1905) of the board interlocks between German banks and
industrial firms. Corporate governance networks kept
inspiring researchers throughout the 20th century. As
described in Mizruchi (1996), in an extensive body of lit-
erature the causes of interlocks were attributed to collusion,
cooptation and monitoring (for example banks keeping an
eye on firms they invested in), legitimacy (hiring board
members with a particular reputation in a certain area that
is of importance to the firm), individual career advance-
ment and social cohesion (social ties among the upper
class). It was established that these networks of board
interlocks furthermore facilitate the spread of governance
routines and practices, the exchange of resources, com-
munication and the dissemination of new ideas (Burris
2005). Beyond the boardroom, the role of other types of
social ties between directors was also found to be of sig-
nificant influence on a number of the aforementioned
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aspects (Barnes 2015). The consequences of well-con-
nected boards are typically described in terms of corporate
control and power, the embeddedness of firms within some
economical system and to some extent, firm performance
(Larcker et al. 2013; Mizruchi 1996). Studying board
interlock networks furthermore gave rise to a debate on the
existence of a transnational capitalist class (Carroll and
Fennema 2002), and differences in behavior between
nationally and transnationally oriented boards were shown
for example in Murray (2014).
Centrality has long been a basic concept in the study
networks of interlocking directorates, in the beginning
focusing mainly on degree centrality. As social network
analysis gained more popularity, new centrality measures
were proposed and applied to understand networks of
interlocking directorates (Fennema 1982), for example to
see differences between banks and nonbanks (Mariolis and
Jones 1982). In Hillman and Dalziel (2003) it is argued that
the function of monitoring and the provisioning of
resources of well-connected board has an effect on firm
performance. However, when it comes to the precise
relationship of firm performance and topological board
interlock network measurements, the results are diverse.
Correlations between centrality and economic performance
are frequently demonstrated, but differ in strength across
studies. For example, in Larcker et al. (2013) it was shown
that higher node centrality in the United States results in
better boardroom performance, measured using a number
of economic performance indicators. In Horton et al.
(2012), it was found that in the United Kingdom, the
connectedness of directors and thus their boards is posi-
tively associated with firm performance, and a similar
conclusion is drawn in Cronin and Popov (2004) for
director networks.
There are also a number of works such as Andres et al.
(2013) that, using the case of Germany, suggest a negative
correlation between firm performance and centrality. In
Croci and Grassi (2014), using data on listed firms in Italy
and a comparison with a number of previous works, it is
argued that there are certainly significant differences
between countries with respect to the correlation of board
centrality and economic performance. Furthermore, the
causal relationship between the connectedness of boards
and the aforementioned consequences is not always clear,
see for example the discussion in Mizruchi (1996). In many
papers it is left for future work to determine whether there
is a causal effect, to study the differences between coun-
tries, or to scale up to sufficient data for a fair cross-country
comparison. Such a comparison is difficult, because data-
sets of board interlock networks have different sources, and
are frequently based on manually gathered data from
annual reports. As a result, studies differ in terms of the
number of firms that is studied and the point in time at
which the study was done, making it hard to objectively
compare results.
In this paper we address a number of these issues, as we
consider the largest 1 million firms across the globe,
allowing us to compare results with sufficient data in each
country. The causal effects remain beyond the scope of this
work, as we are foremost interested in understanding cen-
trality at and between different national and global scales
of the global corporate network network. Our work differs
from studies such as Everett and Borgatti (1999) in a sense
that we still want to take the connectedness of the nodes
within a particular partition of the full network into
account, rather than merging all of the subset’s nodes into
one. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
study in which the global corporate network is analyzed at
such a large scale, particularly in the context of centrality,
investigating the embeddedness of countries in the global
network of corporate control.
3 Preliminaries
This section briefly describes the notation used throughout
the paper to describe the various network aspects consid-
ered in our analyses. Apart from some general graph-the-
oretic terms and definitions, we formalize the two specific
types of networks: the global corporate network consisting
of firms across the globe, and national corporate networks
of firms and interlocks from a particular country. We fur-
thermore give a definition of centrality measures in the
context of corporate networks.
3.1 Global corporate network
The global corporate network is in fact a labeled undi-
rected weighted network (graph) G ¼ ðV ;E;x;/Þ. In this
network, set of nodes V nodes represent firms (also referred
to as boards, companies or corporations). The set of edges
E contains unordered pairs fu; vg (with u; v 2 V and u 6¼ v)
between two firms, denoting the fact that they share a
common senior level director or officer, also referred to as
a board interlock. We use n and m for the number of nodes
|V| and the number of edges |E|, respectively. The value of
degðvÞ stands for the degree, defined as the number of
edges containing node v, so the number of interlocks of a
particular firm’s board.
We aggregate possible parallel edges between firms
(firms that have more than one common senior level
director) by assigning a positive integer weight xðeÞ 1 to
each edge e 2 E, indicating the number of common senior
level directors between the two firms. A path is a sequence
of nodes such that each subsequent pair in this sequence is
directly connected via an edge in the network. A shortest
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path is a path of minimal length, and the length of such a
path, starting at u and ending at v, is a measure indicating
the distance between nodes u and v, denoted d(u, v). If for
a particular maximal subset of nodes V 0 2 V there exists a
path between all pairs of nodes in V 0, then V 0 is called a
connected component. The largest connected component is
referred to as the giant component. If two nodes are in
different components, then there is no path between them
and their pairwise distance is assumed to be infinite.
The country /ðvÞ of a firm v 2 V is defined by the
function /! H which maps each firm to one element of
the set of countries in the world, denoted H.
3.2 National corporate network
For each of the countries, a national corporate network
Gh ¼ ðVh;Eh;xhÞ consisting only of the nodes and edges
of a country h 2 H can be constructed. For the network of a
certain country h, we define Vh ¼ fv 2 V : /ðvÞ ¼ hg and
Eh ¼ f fv;wg 2 E : /ðvÞ ¼ /ðwÞ ¼ h g. Note that
[h2HVh ¼ V , but [h2HEh  E, i.e., the union of the
national node sets is the global node set, but the union of
the national edge sets is not. This is due to the fact that
transnational ties between firms of different countries are
not included in any of the national networks, but are pre-
sent in the global network.
A different way of classifying countries within the
global network would be to say that each country is
actually a partition of the network, where the edges
within the partition are national ties and edges between
different partitions are transnational ties. In theory, dif-
ferent unconnected components of the national network of
some country may be indirectly connected through
another country, so via transnational ties in the global
corporate network. For all countries discussed in this
paper, we found that the giant component of the national
network was also part of the giant component of the full
network.
3.3 Centrality measures
To determine the important actors in a network based on
the structure of the network, centrality measures are com-
monly employed. A centrality measure M assigns a func-
tion value CMðvÞ to each node v 2 V , indicating the extent
to which node v has a central position in the network, based
on the structure of the network. Here we ignore the edge
weights. A centrality ranking is simply a particular order-
ing on the set of nodes such that the for every subsequent
pair u, v in this ranking, CMðuÞCMðvÞ. The list of top-
k most central nodes of a particular network can thus be
identified by sorting the set of nodes based on their
centrality value, and then selecting the k nodes with the
highest centrality value. The four centrality measures
considered in this work are:
Degree centrality
CdðvÞ ¼ degðvÞ
n 1
Closeness centrality
CcðvÞ ¼ 1P
w2V dðv;wÞ
Betweenness centrality
CbðuÞ ¼
X
v;w2V
v 6¼w;u6¼v;u 6¼w
ruðv;wÞ
rðv;wÞ
Here, rðu;wÞ is the number of shortest paths from u to w
and rvðu;wÞ is the number of shortest paths that run
through node v.
Eigenvector centrality
CeðvÞ ¼ EVðvÞ
This measure assumes that each node’s centrality is
based on the centrality values of the nodes that it is
connected to, i.e., its neighbors. It can be computed by
iteratively setting EVðvÞ of all nodes v 2 V to the
average of that of its neighbors, where the initial values
of EVðvÞ are proportional to the degrees of the nodes,
normalizing after each step.
Although numerous other centrality measures have been
suggested in the literature, we believe that these four
measures are the most common ones. More importantly,
they each capture a different type of centrality. Respec-
tively, they are based on a local property of the nodes
(degree centrality), the average distance from the node to
every other node (closeness centrality), the number of
shortest paths that runs through a node (betweenness
centrality) and the centrality of the node based on some
iterative neighborhood-based propagation model (eigen-
vector centrality). Each of the four measures can be
normalized to the interval [0, 1] by dividing it by the
largest value over all nodes. This results in a situation in
which a higher value indicates that the node is more
central according to the considered measure. For a thor-
ough review and analysis of the computational issues
involved in determining the different centrality measures,
we refer the reader to Borgatti and Everett (2006),
Brandes and Pich (2007).
In this study, the use of centrality measures in both the
national and the global networks is considered, resulting in
two ‘‘levels’’ at which we can define centrality:
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1. Global centrality: the centrality of a firm within the
global corporate network, so considering all edges and
ignoring the country attribute.
2. National centrality: the centrality of a firm within the
corporate network of one country, taking into account
only the edges between nodes of the particular
country.
These two levels are essentially specialized cases of cen-
trality in some original network and centrality computed
just within a certain partition of that network. We are
particularly interested in comparing the centrality values of
firms on a global scale to centrality values on the national
scale, so based on a certain country. The main question is
then how we should we actually compare national and
global centrality rankings, which is the topic of the fol-
lowing section.
4 Centrality comparison techniques
Now that have the ‘‘ingredients’’ to model networks and to
compute centrality at different scales of the corporate
network, let us consider how we are going to interpret and
compare them. The application of a centrality measure to a
network dataset results in a ranking of nodes based on their
structural position in the network. The advantage of using a
ranking is that it counters the problems involved in bluntly
comparing (averages of) centrality values between net-
works, as these values are inherently incomparable due to
the different structure (size, density, clustering, etc.) of the
compared networks. The main methodological question
addressed in this section is therefore:
How can we compare two different centrality rank-
ings, possibly of different length, where the objects of
one ranking are a subset of the other?
Ideally, we capture the relation between the two rankings
in one properly normalized number, so that it is easy to
compare results quantitatively. Indeed, given the sheer size
of our network data, any manual comparison is infeasible,
and the focus is therefore on an automated comparison
approach. Although the issue of comparing centrality
rankings is relevant for the analysis of any type of network
dataset, we use the global corporate network as a running
example. Figure 2 is a fictive ranking resulting from
applying a particular centrality measure to the global
network (left) and a second ranking that solely bases its
centrality values on firms in Great Britain (right), indeed
comparing global centrality and national centrality as
discussed in Sect. 3.3. The remainder of this section
considers three types of ranking comparison techniques:
match-based measures, correlation-based measures and
baseline-improvement measures, introducing two new
methods in the last two categories. The discussed measures
are finally summarized in Table 1.
4.1 Matching-based measures
One of the most trivial ways of comparing two rankings,
both of length n, is to count the overlap in the top-k (for
some 0\k\n) of these two rankings, and expressing this
count as a percentage of k. For example, in the ranking in
Fig. 2, the overlap in the top-4 between the global and
British ranking is 2, resulting in an overlap of 0.5.
Although easy to compute and interpret and widely used
for analyzing centrality in social networks, this way of
comparing rankings does not take into account the order of
the objects in the ranking: the matched firms
GBERNST&YOUNGEUROPEandPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
are ranked in a different order in the two lists, which is not
reflected in this simple measure of overlap between lists.
Furthermore, when a ranking of a partition of the network
is compared to a ranking of the full network (in this
example the GB partition), the difference in the length of
the lists is not considered, nor is attention given to the fact
that firms may have the same rank because their centrality
Fig. 2 Fictive example of top-8 most central nodes at two different
scales
Table 1 Features of different
centrality ranking comparison
techniques
Match-based Correlation-based Baseline-improvement
Compare lists   
Handle equal centrality values  
Order-preserving 
Account for rank difference  
Nested inequal lengths rankings 
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values are equal. Also, we note that for smaller values of k,
the overlap is frequently equal to 0 (in the example, this
would be the case for k ¼ 2); the cutoff always is some-
what arbitrarily chosen, and may even cut the ranking right
in the middle of a range of nodes with equal centrality
values.
4.2 Correlation-based measures
Computing the relation between two equal length rankings
is traditionally done using the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient, measuring the extent to which the relationship
between two variables can be described using a monotonic
function (Spearman 1904). Especially when understanding
centrality rankings in real-world network data, Spearman is
frequently used (Hahn and Kern 2005; Yan and Ding
2009). Because we are interested in whether the rankings
(and not so much the values) are equivalent, the measure of
rank correlation is specifically suitable, as it is not subject
to the size of the considered networks or the applied
method of centrality value normalization. The advantage of
applying Spearman rank correlation is that the exact dif-
ference in ranking between all pairs of nodes in both sets is
taken into account. Note that if we are not interested in the
difference in ranking but merely in whether or not the
distinct pairs of nodes in the different lists are correctly
ordered, we could also have used Kendall’s tau, measuring
the relation between the number of concordant (correctly
ordered in both lists) and disconcordant pairs of nodes.
Compared to matching-based methods, the advantage of
correlation-based methods is that they can take the order of
objects into account, and are not biased by some arbitrary
cutoff. They are furthermore able to cope with equal cen-
trality values. In such cases, so when objects in the data
have identical values, Spearman typically assigns a rank to
these objects that is set to the average of the rank range
these objects are positioned in. This ensures that the sum of
all ranks remains intact. The only problem is that tradi-
tionally, to compute a rank correlation, the rankings need to
be of equal length.
For comparing local and global centrality rankings, we
propose a new metric called centrality persistence, and
define it for some partition S  V as the Spearman rank
correlation rc between the centrality values of the nodes in
S computed based on the network of only the nodes in S,
compared to the centrality values of S, but then computed
as part of the full network’s node set V (both according to
the same centrality measure M). Formally:
rcðS;VÞ ¼ Spearman correlationðCSM ;CVMÞ
Here, CXM is the vector of centrality values computed using
centrality measure M applied to the network consisting of
all nodes (and edges between nodes) in set X  V , setting a
null value for nodes not in X. The function
Spearman correlationðA;BÞ computes the Spearman
correlation (as described above) for the overlapping (non-
null in both) entries in A and B.
In our corporate board interlock networks, centrality
persistence measures for a particular country the rank
correlation between national centrality (within that country
partition S) given by the vector CSM and global centrality
given by the vector CVM . So, it assesses the extent to which
the ranking of firms in a country (partition) is maintained
(persistent, value of 1) or distorted (value of 1) in the full
dataset. In contrast to the number of advantages of corre-
lation-based methods described above, we note that the
unequal size of the rankings is still a bit of a problem.
Given that we only consider objects in the smaller list, we
throw away information about the position of the objects in
the full ranking. In the example in Fig. 2 we would only be
able to compare the relation between four British firms in
the global ranking to the national ranking, regardless of
where these British firms are positioned in the global
ranking. Essentially, in comparing rankings based on cor-
relation, we investigate if the order of some ranking in the
partition is preserved in the full ranking, i.e., we measure
its persistence, but we do not yet know how central the
nodes in this partition actually are in the full network.
4.3 Baseline-improvement measures
The matching-based and correlation-based techniques dis-
cussed above are not specifically designed to handle the
comparison of rankings based on a partition and rankings
based on the full network dataset. Here we propose an
additional metric to solve this problem, by assuming that
the considered partition is a random sample of the data,
implying that the centrality values are simply the centrality
values of nodes that are selected in a uniformly random
way from the full set of nodes. This in turn would mean
that the nodes in the partition are assumed to be uniformly
distributed over the ranking. Then we compute for the
particular considered partition the extent to which the
ranking of its nodes differs from a random distribution of
these nodes over the full ranking. An alternative yet
functionally equal definition would be to say that we are
measuring the extent to which the subset is on average
embedded in the middle, more near the top, or near the
bottom of the ranking.
Assume that a node v 2 S according to some centrality
ranking has rank rðvÞ 2 ½1; jV j in the full rank of all nodes
in V, where a rank of 1 is highest (most central) and |V| is
lowest (least central). We then propose to compute the
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embeddedness of the partition in the full ranking using
centrality ranking dominance rdðS;VÞ, defined as:
rdðS;VÞ ¼ 1
2

P
v2S rðvÞ
jSj  ðjV j þ 1Þ
If the value of rdðS;VÞ is smaller than 0, it means that the
partition is on average less central (it has a higher than
average ranking sum) in the full network, whereas a value
higher than 0 means it is on average more central (it has a
lower than average ranking sum). A partition exactly in the
middle of the ranking would have a value equal to 0. More
details as well as a proof of the validity of this metric for
determining rank dominance is given in Appendix A.
In the example in Fig. 2, the British firms have ranks 3,
4, 6 and 8, summing to 21, resulting in a value of
rdðVGB;VÞ ¼ 12 21=ð4  ð8þ 1ÞÞ ¼ 0:083, meaning that
the partition of British firms is less central than expected.
On the contrary, the United States with firms at rank 1 and
2, summing to 3, has a centrality ranking dominance value
of rdðVUS;VÞ ¼ 12  3=ð2  ð8þ 1ÞÞ ¼ þ0:333, indeed
indicating that the US firms are ranked higher than
expected.
Centrality ranking dominance gives an indication of
whether a partition has on average a lower or higher
position in the full ranking, i.e., it indicates the dominance
of the partition. In Sect. 6 we will use centrality ranking
dominance together with the centrality persistence measure
to compare the embeddedness of economic power orders
within countries in the global network. Finally we note that
together, these two measures cover the five important
features of ranking comparison techniques surveyed above
and summarized in Table 1.
5 Network topology
In this section, we describe how our dataset was collected,
discuss its quality and provide an overview of the (struc-
tural) properties of the resulting global corporate network,
as well as topological characteristics of the largest 34
national networks considered in our cross-country
comparison.
5.1 Data collection
The data used in this paper originates from the ORBIS
database of Bureau van Dijk, which contains information
on over 100 million public and private companies world-
wide. An extraction of data on the largest firms worldwide
that were registered as ‘‘very large’’ or ‘‘large’’, and as
‘‘active’’ was made in July 2013. Only companies for
which information was available on the country of
domicile and the senior directors (board of directors,
executive board, supervisory board or senior management)
were selected. We include all personal interlocks at both
the senior management and board level, particularly
because of the diversity in classifications of board and top
management positions across the globe. Because we are
specifically interested in the network connecting corporate
boards, we include only interlocks based on persons; firms
that are registered as board members are disregarded. The
result is a list of 971,891 firms and a total of 3,272,523 top
executives.
5.2 Data quality
The quality of the ORBIS data is more than reasonable, and
for most larger firms, the error rate is low. Overall, ORBIS
is recognized as a reliable data provider in a number of
previous works (Compston 2013; Vitali et al. 2011). An
extensive study of how representative this dataset is for the
global economy based on, among other things, a compar-
ison with the relative GDP, is given in Heemskerk and
Takes (2016). All in all, we are confident that our dataset
captures the vast majority of significant worldwide eco-
nomic activity.
Given the large size of our dataset, a valid question is
whether or not all interlocks are present at the same time,
as the duration of the interlock is not explicitly included in
the data. It should be noted that given that boards of larger
companies meet every month and appoint their members
for four years, on average re-electing a member once, there
is close to one hundred opportunities for interaction
between board members, facilitating the type of commu-
nication, interaction, exchange of ideas and resources
known to come with board interlocks (see Mizruchi (1996)
and the references in Sect. 2). In light of the low average
pairwise distance between nodes (see later in this section),
it is thus safe to assume that we can interpret the board
interlocks as if they take place at the same time. It is
anecdotally noted in the literature that if boards meet every
month, given the low average pairwise node-to-node dis-
tance of the small world interlock networks, an infectious
disease affecting only directors could wipe out the majority
of the corporate elite in well under a year (Davis 1991).
Finally, we note the presence of a number of adminis-
trative ties between firms in our dataset, for example as a
result of how firms organize themselves through multiple
legal entities or pyramidal structures of holding companies
and corporate groups. Given the sheer size of the data there
is no way to manually filter these ties given the available
data. In line with previous work, we choose to leave these
ties be, meaning that we have to take the presence of these
ties into account when interpreting empirical results. For a
lengthy discussion on the considerations around filtering
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these administrative ties, the reader is referred to Heems-
kerk and Takes (2016).
5.3 Network properties
The list of firms and directors extracted from the source
database is essentially a two-mode network. From this
network, we can generate a projection of the firm-by-firm
network by for each director adding an edge for every
distinct pair of boards that this director sits on. This results
in the global board interlock network that will be our main
structure of interest. Table 2 shows some statistics of this
undirected network. Note that it only contains firms with at
least one board interlock, thus filtering non-interlocking
firms and reducing the number of firms (nodes) from
971,891 to 391,967.
The density, defined as the relation between the number
of edges and the maximum number of edges, is low, as is
common in many real-world networks. Figure 3 shows the
degree distribution of the network, which follows a power-
law distribution and has a fat tail, again resembling many
other real-world (social) networks (Kleinberg 2000). The
fat tail is comprised of relatively few (note the logarithmic
vertical axis) large firms with multiple economic entities
that share a large number of senior directors. For example,
some large accounting firms insist on all their partners
being formal board members, demonstrating a type of
administrative ties, as discussed in Sect. 5.2. Although the
effect of these administrative ties is small and merely local,
it is something to take into account when studying a local
metric such as degree centrality, as we will see later.
Next, the component size distribution for all 55,616
components (excluding the largest component of size
238,859) is given in Fig. 4. We can observe that apart from
the giant component, all other components are significantly
smaller: they consist of at most 60 nodes, with a clear peek
at a size of 1–5. The vast majority of these small compo-
nents represent simple ‘‘parent/subsidiary’’ structures that
do not share directors with the giant component, and are
therefore hardly relevant for this study.
Going from the full network to the giant component, the
number of nodes drops with 39% to 238, 859. However,
the number of edges drops only by 10%, indicating that the
majority of interlocking activity is captured in the 90% of
edges that reside within the giant component. Indeed, the
other smaller components appear to be small isolated
groups of firms mostly from the same country. The main
focus of the remainder of this paper will therefore be on the
giant component. We note that the high clustering
Table 2 Global network properties
Global corporate network
Nodes (firms) 391,967
Edges (interlocks) 1,711,968
Density 2:229  105
Average degree 8.746
Clustering coefficient 0.755
Connected components 55,616
Giant component
Nodes (firms) 238,859 nodes (60:9%)
Edges (interlocks) 1,533,030 (89:5%)
Density 5:374  105
Average degree 12.83
Clustering coefficient 0.751
Average distance 7.775
Radius 18
Diameter 34
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coefficient of 0.751 is partly attributed to the way in which
the network was constructed: if an officer serves on more
than one board, then all boards on which he serves are
connected, automatically realizing a larger than normal
number of closed triangles, which is exactly what is
reflected by the clustering coefficient.
Figure 5 shows the distance distribution of the largest
component (sampled over 100,000 node pairs), with the
average pairwise distance at 7.775, which is consistent with
other small world networks, but slightly higher than other
social networks where the value is usually around 6 or
lower. The node eccentricity (length of the longest shortest
path starting at a particular node) distribution over all
nodes in the largest connected component is given in
Fig. 6, starting at the radius (18) and ending at the diameter
(34) and also has the familiar unimodal shape that is
common in real-world networks (Takes and Kosters 2013).
Table 3 lists the most important previously discussed
measures and statistics for the 34 considered national net-
works, identified by their ISO 2-letter country codes. The
differences in the number of firms per country are a result
of the fact that some countries are larger and economically
more developed than others. Properties that can be derived
from other reported metrics have been left out for read-
ability. The rightmost column titled ‘‘Transnat. factor’’
indicates the factor by which the number of edges increases
if the transnational ties of this country are included. We
observe in Table 3 that Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH),
China (CN), Finland (FI), the Cayman Islands (KY),
Luxembourg (LU) and Romania (RO) stand out here with a
relatively high number transnational ties. This may be seen
as evidence of the outward orientation of these countries.
However, simply counting the number of transnational ties
may be a too simple approach for determining this, as it
merely considers the number of local transnational con-
nections. Therefore we will try to better understand this
observation using more complex metrics of embeddedness
in Sect. 6.
Most interesting to note about Table 3 is that in each of
the countries, the average distance between nodes is low,
typically much lower than the average distance of 7.775 in
the full global network. The average distance over all 34
countries is 5.734, and the weighted average distance (so,
compensating for the number of firms in a country) is
6.204. This may be a first hint to the fact that the national
footprint of countries is still present in the global network:
apparently the transnational ties in the full global network
are not able to connect the national networks in such a way
that the average distance remains as low as in the national
networks.
6 Centrality experiments
In this section we perform experiments using the dataset
described in Sect. 5. First, in Sect. 6.1 we directly use
centrality measures in an attempt to characterize their
stability by means of a comparison with firm prominence.
Then, we use the newly proposed metrics centrality per-
sistence and centrality ranking dominance to understand
the relation between national and global centrality in
respectively Sects. 6.2 and 6.3, ending with a number of
general results and remarks in Sect. 6.4.
6.1 Comparing centrality measures
After applying the four different centrality measures
described in Sect. 3.3 (betweenness centrality, closeness
centrality, degree centrality and eigenvector centrality) to
the giant component of the full global network, we can
immediately observe that these measures are all correlated,
in line with previous studies of centrality (Borgatti and
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Everett 2006; Freeman 1979). The first four rows of
Table 4 show this correlation using the rank correlation
coefficient for each pair of centrality measures. The results
in Table 4 are in line with expectations with respect to how
the measures are defined: betweenness centrality, measur-
ing the extent to which a node has a brokerage-like position
is least correlated with the other three measures. Eigen-
vector centrality and closeness centrality are highly cor-
related, indeed both taking the full network into account,
considering each node contributing to the centrality value
proportional to how far away it is. Each of the considered
measures is correlated with degree centrality, being the
most simple measure of centrality, merely counting the
number of local connections. Given the low average pair-
wise distances in real-world networks, obviously the direct
neighborhood size (i.e., the degree) of a node has influence
on any centrality measure.
Table 3 Network properties of
giant components of the largest
34 national networks
ISO2 Country Nodes Density Clust. coeff. Avg. dist. Transnat. factor
AT Austria 2142 0.00440 0.273 5.58 0.79
AU Australia 1897 0.00382 0.085 4.94 0.58
BE Belgium 3264 0.00254 0.123 5.17 1.57
CA Canada 5439 0.00146 0.072 5.20 0.52
CH Switzerland 999 0.00620 0.077 4.78 1.63
CN China 891 0.00475 0.132 5.80 1.18
CO Colombia 1951 0.00298 0.090 5.61 0.34
DE Germany 7224 0.00142 0.320 8.15 0.63
DK Denmark 4517 0.00229 0.163 5.61 0.78
ES Spain 11,102 0.00143 0.156 6.30 0.25
FI Finland 2626 0.00294 0.174 5.52 1.11
FR France 8896 0.00083 0.170 6.13 0.77
GB United Kingdom 32,962 0.00067 0.356 6.63 0.26
IE Ireland 2497 0.01479 0.178 5.78 0.39
IL Israel 962 0.01233 0.065 3.88 0.21
IN India 5911 0.00173 0.047 4.72 0.20
IT Italy 4483 0.00125 0.198 7.57 0.88
JP Japan 2605 0.00119 0.113 7.20 0.21
KR South Korea 2802 0.00174 0.124 5.83 0.05
KY Cayman Islands 642 0.00693 0.098 5.40 3.90
LU Luxembourg 1484 0.00705 0.196 6.72 1.55
MX Mexico 931 0.00852 0.159 4.31 0.43
MY Malaysia 7878 0.00398 0.115 4.50 0.07
NL Netherlands 6083 0.00271 0.225 7.61 0.84
NO Norway 8963 0.00130 0.173 5.69 0.40
PT Portugal 2120 0.00488 0.138 5.45 0.56
RO Romania 656 0.00648 0.189 7.63 1.92
RU Russia 2939 0.00263 0.102 6.57 0.08
SE Sweden 6656 0.00166 0.430 6.40 0.79
SG Singapore 1472 0.00709 0.080 4.14 0.90
TH Thailand 981 0.00555 0.086 4.90 0.31
US United States 24,802 0.00024 0.228 6.71 0.48
VN Vietnam 1393 0.00558 0.090 4.44 0.01
ZA South Africa 963 0.00837 0.110 4.10 0.74
Table 4 Correlation between centrality measures and with firm
prominence (revenue), n ¼ 238; 859
Betweenness Closeness Degree Eigenvector
Betweenness 1.000 0.430 0.521 0.356
Closeness 0.430 1.000 0.495 0.902
Degree 0.521 0.495 1.000 0.498
Eigenvector 0.356 0.902 0.498 1.000
Firm prominence 0.192 0.109 0:046 0.064
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Now that we have an idea of the relation between the
measures themselves, let us see how the measures are
related to firm prominence by comparing them with rev-
enue. As argued in Sect. 1, this provides us with an indi-
cation of which measure is most representative for finding
powerful actors in the global corporate network. The last
row of Table 4 shows the results. We observe that of the
four considered measures, betweenness centrality is most
correlated with revenue at the global level, albeit a weak
correlation. To further investigate, we can look at how firm
centrality within individual countries correlates with rev-
enue. For the largest 34 countries (listed in Table 3), the
results of this experiment on a national level are shown in
Fig. 7. This figure essentially visualizes the same results as
in the bottom row of Table 4, but now for each of the
countries, ignoring transnational ties. We see how in most
countries, there is a weak to medium strong, but mostly
positive correlation between revenue and centrality, for
almost each of the measures.
The country-specific results are in line with results
regarding firm performance that are presented for example
for board interlock networks in the United States (US)
Horton et al. (2012) and United Kingdom (GB) Larcker
et al. (2013) and for director networks in Cronin and Popov
(2004). At the same time they are conflicting with studies
done on the board interlock networks of Germany and Italy
presented in Andres et al. (2013), Croci and Grassi (2014).
A possible explanation for these differences may be found
in the difference between data sources as well as the dif-
ferences across studies in terms of which performance
indicator the centrality metrics are compared to.
Based on our experiments, we do establish that
betweenness centrality seems the most suitable measure:
apart from in Canada (CA) and Vietnam (VN) it is always
weakly positively correlated with firm prominence. Indeed,
we also saw this higher positive correlation in the full
global network (Table 4). Degree centrality and
eigenvector centrality are in a few countries negatively
correlated with firm prominence. Manually inspecting the
data for some of the outliers based on degree centrality (the
Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (GB) and Canada
(CA)) revealed multiple large densely connected commu-
nities of firms with very high degrees but no significant
revenue, typical for the structures based on administrative
ties discussed in Sect. 5.2. These firms of course influence
measures such as degree and eigenvector centrality.
Noteworthy is the fact that again betweenness centrality in
the Netherlands and United Kingdom shows no significant
difference with other countries. In general, it is often said
that degree centrality is a too simple measure of centrality,
as it only measures connections locally, explaining its
sometimes more erratic results when compared to revenue.
As eigenvector centrality is ultimately biased toward high-
degree nodes, the various negative correlations for this
measure are also understandable.
There are vast differences between countries and how
centrality is correlated with firm revenue, echoing the
diverse results in previous work on the relation between
firm performance and centrality. Apparently, at least for
revenue, not in every country the well-performing firms
that hold the most central positions in the board interlock
network. Furthermore, we observe that across countries,
the centrality values according to different measures can
differ a lot. These findings suggests that, contrary to what is
sometimes done (Larcker et al. 2013), assessing the cen-
trality of a firm by averaging different centrality values,
may at least in our case be too rigorous of an approach.
Finally, we note that the correlation between revenue and
centrality in the global network is much lower than in most
of the national networks. In addition to our observations
made at the end of Sect. 5.3, this finding is a second piece
of evidence suggesting that there are at least mechanisms at
a local (national) scale that influence tie formation in the
(global) board interlock network.
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Fig. 7 Correlation between firm prominence (revenue) and national centrality for the 34 countries in Table 3
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6.2 Centrality persistence
The second question that we aim to answer using our
centrality experiments, is whether we can say something
about how the order of firms on a national level is pre-
served in the global network. We proposed a measure for
this in Sect. 4.2 called centrality persistence, measuring the
persistence of the order of a country’s central firms within
the global network. Recall that to compute this metric, we
compare the rank correlation between firm centrality at the
national level (so within a particular country) and the
global level. The results are shown in Fig. 8 for each of the
four considered centrality measures.
Degree centrality persistence shows a noteworthy result.
For most countries degree centrality values at a national
and global scale are highly correlated: this is a direct result
of the fact that degree centrality measures only direct
connections, and nothing beyond that. If there is a big
difference between national and global degree centrality, it
means that there is a large number of transnational ties
connected to firms in these countries, as this is the only
local difference in edges between a country’s nodes in the
national and global network. Noteworthy are Switzerland
(CH), Luxembourg (LU) and Cayman Islands (KY), as
they show the lowest degree centrality persistence values
over all countries. These countries are frequently identified
in the literature as having large internationally oriented
financial sectors (Heemskerk and Takes 2016). The same
observation holds to a lesser extent for Belgium (BE),
China (CN) and Finland (FI). If we compare these results to
the relative number of transnational ties listed in Table 3 in
the column ‘‘Transnat. factor’’, we see a clear relation with
degree centrality persistence. Indeed, degree centrality
persistence measures indirectly the extent to which a
country has a large number of transnational ties. The
transnational factor (or a simple count of the number of
such ties) is often used in the literature to indicate glob-
alizing countries based on networks of interlocking
directorates, see for example Burris and Staples (2012),
Veen and Kratzer (2011), and degree centrality persistence
essentially mirrors this aspect. In Sect. 6.3 we will inves-
tigate more elaborate ways of determining whether each of
these countries with a large number of transnational ties are
actually dominant globalizing players within the world-
wide economy.
As for the other measures, eigenvector and closeness
centrality seem to again produce results that are very
similar to degree centrality, as explained in the previous
section. Let us now turn to the persistence of the ranking
based on betweenness centrality, which we established as
the relatively most stable indicator of prominence in the
previous section. Figure 8 shows that for Switzerland
(CH), Luxembourg (LU) and the Cayman Islands (KY),
analogously to degree centrality, we have low betweenness
centrality persistence values. This suggests that the
appearance of additional transnational ties had significant
influence on the brokerage position of the firms in these
countries as well. Ireland (IE) also stands out here with a
relatively low betweenness centrality persistence value, yet
it does not have a significantly larger number of transna-
tional ties like the other three ‘‘outliers.’’
The general conclusion here is that most countries have
a high centrality persistence value, meaning that overall,
the order of firms is well preserved in the full network. This
in turn serves as a third piece of evidence that national
footprints are still inherently present in the global network.
However, what can we observe from the differences in
centrality persistence between countries, i.e., when we
compare the centrality persistence values between different
countries? Specifically, what happens when we compare
the values to macro-economic indicators describing these
countries?
Most notably, we observe a correlation of 0.652 (with a
P value of 2:91  105) between betweenness centrality
persistence and GDP. This means that to some extent, the
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Fig. 8 Centrality persistence for the 34 largest countries
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higher the GDP (so, the larger the country’s economy), the
higher the centrality persistence value. This may indicate
that, in general, countries with larger economies are also
better at exhibiting the economic order of their firms within
the global economy, i.e., they are better able to translate
their power and control at the national level to the global
level. The relation between GDP and betweenness cen-
trality persistence is plotted separately for each of the 34
countries in Fig. 9.
We note that large economic powers such as the United
States (US) and China (CN) are also exhibiting high cen-
trality persistence, indicating that their national economic
order of power hardly changes between the national and the
global level. We may want to understand why certain
countries with a similar GDP have roughly the same cen-
trality persistence value. For example, in Fig. 9, one may
recognize two clusters of nodes; one with a group of firms
strictly above the fitted line and one group below it. The
first group consists mostly of developed countries such as
Canada (CA), Germany (DE), France (FR), the United
Kingdom (GB), Italy (IT) and Spain (ES), but also India
(IN). The second group contains the larger Scandinavian
countries, but nearby are also South Africa (ZA) and
Colombia (CO). The countries within these groups
obviously exhibit significant institutional differences. A
natural question is how we can better understand the dif-
ferences in centrality values of these seemingly similarly
persistent countries. However, centrality persistence only
gives a characterization of how prevalent a country’s
centrality ranking is, but it does not indicate whether the
ranking is more persistent near the bottom or top of the
global ranking, which we will investigate next.
6.3 Centrality ranking dominance
We discussed in Sect. 4 (and summarized in Table 1) that
the only downside of correlation-based comparison meth-
ods is that they do not measure very well whether a par-
tition is more near the top or the bottom of a ranking of the
nodes in the full network. Therefore, we now turn to
experiments using the measure of centrality ranking dom-
inance suggested in Sect. 4.3. The results for computing
this measure for the 34 largest countries are shown in
Fig. 10. Furthermore, a diagram showing both centrality
ranking dominance and centrality persistence for each of
the countries, is given in Fig. 11.
Recall that based on centrality persistence (see Fig. 9)
we were not able to distinguish so well between outliers
such as Switzerland (CH) and the Cayman Islands (KY).
Based on centrality dominance ranking we clearly can:
these countries are quite the opposite in terms of the
extent to which they dominate the centrality ranking.
Although both are known for their large financial sectors,
the Cayman Islands (KY) are frequently identified as
transnationally oriented for administrative reasons or even
fiscal benefits (Heemskerk and Takes 2016), whereas
Switzerland is known to be an influential actor in at least
the European business community (Heemskerk et al.
2013). This is reflected in Fig. 10 with a low dominance
value for the Cayman Islands and a high value for
Switzerland.
Fig. 9 Betweenness centrality persistence versus normalized
log(GDP) for the 34 countries in Table 3
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Fig. 10 Centrality ranking dominance for the 34 countries in Table 3 (based on betweenness centrality)
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In the previous section, we also noted that Scandinavian
countries such as Sweden (SE) and Colombia (CO) had a
similar betweenness centrality persistence value. If we look
at Figs. 10 and 11, we see that they are quite different in
terms of centrality ranking dominance: Sweden and Fin-
land are more represented at the top of the ranking than
Colombia. Typical well-developed western countries such
as Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), France (FR), United
States (US) and Sweden (SE) lead the ranking, but also
South Africa (ZA) and Mexico (MX) are ranked higher.
The latter two illustrate the brokerage position of these
countries in the global economy. Mexico connects Latin
America and Europa (mostly through Spain), whereas
South Africa connects the UK to Africa and parts of Asia.
Along a similar line, with centrality ranking dominance we
can now better distinguish the relatively lower ranked India
(IN) from the western European countries that were
observed to have a similar GDP and betweenness centrality
persistence value in Sect. 6.2. Near the bottom of the
ranking based on centrality dominance in Fig. 10 we also
find China; apparently the Chinese firms are on average
more located near the bottom of the global ranking. On the
contrary, the United States (US) which based on centrality
persistence appeared to mirror China, has a substantially
higher rank and can thus be said to have a more dominant
position in the economic order. This may be due to the fact
that in Asia, board interlocks were mainly used to integrate
firms operating in distinct business groups (Fennema 1982;
Granovetter 2010).
Another example of added value of the centrality
ranking dominance metric is the difference between China
(CN) and Switzerland (CH). Based on the relative number
of transnational ties in Table 3 we cannot easily distinguish
between the two, but using the ranking dominance metric
we can: Switzerland uses its transnational ties to obtain a
dominant position in the global centrality ranking, whereas
China clearly does not. Indeed, it is well known that China
is actively participating in the global economy, but is not
yet as well integrated as other countries of the same size.
The result for China is also to be expected: in previous
work we already observed that especially China resides in
its own subcommunity in the global board interlock net-
work: China is the central country of the first persistent
community discovered by a network community detection
algorithm (Heemskerk and Takes 2016). For Romania
(RO), which also stood out in Table 3, we observe a similar
low ranking dominance value.
The discussion and interpretation of results presented
above demonstrates how in addition to centrality persis-
tence and a count of the number of transnational ties, the
measure of centrality ranking dominance allows us to
better understand the relation between the national and
global centrality rankings of different countries.
6.4 Discussion
The two discussed methods of centrality persistence and
centrality ranking dominance allow centrality measures to
be interpreted at different scales of the network. Together,
they provide insight in the extent to which a partition is on
the one hand able to preserve its centrality ranking in the
full network (persistence) and on the other hand whether
the partition is on average more near the top or the bottom
of the centrality ranking in the full network (dominance).
The results of these experiments result in a number of
contributions to research on interlocking directorates.
Whereas in board interlock literature traditionally only
the number of transnational ties (as shown in Table 3) is used
to characterize a country’s participation in the global econ-
omy, we are now able to better distinguish between countries
based on the extent to which they are holding a central
position at the national and global scale of the network.
Furthermore, the two proposed measures can help under-
stand the inward and outward orientation of a country and its
firms. Finally, they allow us to assess the embeddedness of
countries based on the concepts of persistence and domi-
nance, allowing more fine-grained insight in the extent to
which a country is participating in the global economy.
In studying the corporate board interlock network, we do
not per se find evidence for key determinants based on
institutional patterns such as those demonstrated in Veen
and Kratzer (2011), but instead we do see sector effects, in
particular the financial sector and its influence on countries
such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands.
An extensive investigation of the precise cultural, geo-
historical, political and economical differences and simi-
larities of countries is nevertheless beyond the scope of this
paper.
6.5 Final remarks
We stress that the two proposed metrics have potential
applications in many other types of networks that have
Fig. 11 Betweenness centrality persistence versus ranking
dominance
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attributes on the nodes that allow partitions of the full
network to be studied. For example, in an online social
network, the country of residence of a user could be used,
whereas in scientific collaboration network the scientific
field of the authors could be used to partition the network.
We furthermore note that the experiments only report
on significant correlations. For example, the reported
correlations with revenue at a firm level and GDP at a
country level are not as strong for country-level demo-
graphics such as the population count or the GDP per
capita of a country. Even more so, it should be noted that
the proposed metrics operate independently of other
topological metrics such as the number of firms (nodes),
number of interlocks (edges), nor is there a noteworthy
correlation between these basic network metrics and the
proposed measures of persistence and dominance. All
these findings support the general argument that a network
approach truly provides additional insight compared to
simply comparing countries using standard (macro-)eco-
nomic attributes of these countries.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated the concept of centrality in the global
corporate board interlock network as well as within dif-
ferent national networks. Apart from the fact that centrality
measures are obviously correlated with each other, we also
find notable differences between countries. Most impor-
tantly, firm prominence and centrality do not always go
hand in hand: large differences between countries have
been demonstrated. In addition to previous work in which
we showed how community detection revealed the foot-
prints of national networks within the global network, this
paper provides additional evidence for these regional
effects based on both the network topology. First, we
observe how on average, the 34 largest national networks
are more tightly connected (based on the average pairwise
distance) than the global network. Second, we note that the
relation between firm prominence and revenue is stronger
in most of the national networks than in the global network,
suggesting that there are mechanisms at the national level
influencing the formation of board interlocks. Third, using
the newly introduced measure of centrality persistence, the
persistence of a national order of firms (ranked by cen-
trality) within the global network is measured, showing
high persistence values for a large number of countries.
This means that for these countries, the economic order on
a global scale is similar to that on the local scale, the third
piece of evidence for the aforementioned national
footprints. When comparing this persistence between
countries, we find that there is a correlation with GDP:
countries with larger economies are better at preserving
their firm’s central positions within the global corporate
network than countries with smaller economies, although
the persistence metric is not subject to the size (number of
ties). The proposed centrality ranking dominance measures
furthermore indicates the extent to which a country’s firms
are at a dominant position in a centrality ranking. Together,
the two newly introduced measures of persistence and
dominance give an indication of the extent to which a
country’s firms are at a central position at both a national
and a global scale. The metrics allow us to get more fine-
grained insight in the dominance and persistence of power
and control of a country’s firms at different scales of the
global board interlock network.
In future work, the applicability of our newly proposed
measure of centrality persistence and ranking dominance
could be further investigated. In corporate networks, non-
geographical aspects, such as the sector in which the firm
operates, could be used to define an alternative partitioning
of the firms in the global network, allowing the influence of
sectors to be investigated in a similar way as we did with
countries. This will however provide new challenges, as
the sectors themselves are not necessarily as connected as
countries. Furthermore, we plan to extend this research to
the full corporate network consisting not only of large firms
in the ORBIS database, but all firms, potentially increasing
the number of nodes to over 200 million. One question is
then whether or not considering all firms instead of just
large firms influences the result, or that the majority of
activity is already captured in our current selection of firms
and directors. Finally, we plan to study the concept of
centrality in corporate networks over time, as the global
corporate network is constantly evolving through the for-
mation of new board interlock ties.
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Appendix A
Centrality ranking dominance
The measure of centrality ranking dominance rdðS;VÞ
proposed in Sect. 4.3 computes the extent to which the
ranking of nodes in a partition S  V of the graph G ¼
ðV;EÞ based on their centrality values is positioned near
the top, middle or bottom of a ranking of the nodes,
quantified using respectively a positive, zero or negative
measure value in the range ½ 1
2
; 1
2
. In this short section we
prove that this metric accomplishes exactly the function-
ality described above.
Abstracting away from the network aspect, we have a
set V of objects that are ranked according to a centrality
measure, meaning that we have a one-to-one mapping
function r that maps the nodes v 2 V to a rank integer
2 f1; 2; . . .; jVjg, where 1 is the highest rank. We further-
more have a subset S  V for which we want to determine
whether the ranks r(s) for all s 2 S are more dominant near
the top, middle or bottom of the ranking. To do so, the
measure of centrality ranking dominance rd(S, V) is for-
mally defined as:
rdðS;VÞ ¼ 1
2

P
v2S rðvÞ
jSj  ðjV j þ 1Þ
If S ¼ V , then
X
v2S
rðvÞ ¼
X
v2V
rðvÞ ¼ 1
2
 jVj  ðjV j þ 1Þ;
which means that
rdðS;VÞ ¼ rdðV ;VÞ ¼ 1
2

1
2
 jVj  ðjV j þ 1Þ
jV j  ðjVj þ 1Þ ¼
1
2
 1
2
¼ 0;
precisely indicating with a value of 0 that S is the middle of
the ranking, i.e., V is in the middle of V itself. If jSj ¼ 1
with S ¼ fsg, then
rdðS;VÞ ¼ rdðfsg;VÞ ¼ 1
2
 rðsÞjfsgj  ðjVj þ 1Þ ¼
1
2
 rðsÞjV j þ 1 :
For rðsÞ ¼ 1, rdðfsg;VÞ approaches a value of 1
2
, and
similarly for rðsÞ ¼ jVj the value approaches  1
2
. The
metric is in that sense symmetric. When s is exactly in the
middle of the ranking, for odd size V we have
rðsÞ ¼ jVj=2d e, resulting in
rdðfsg;VÞ ¼ 1
2
 jV j=2d ejV j þ 1 ¼
1
2
 1
2
¼ 0;
whereas for even size V there would be no way to get a
precise value of 0 as one element can never be exactly in
the middle of an even length ranking. In such an even
length ranking, rðsÞ ¼ jV j=2 results in a value slightly
lower than 0 and rðsÞ ¼ ðjV j=2Þ þ 1 gives a value slightly
higher than 0.
If the partition S0 contains more than one node, then for
each node s added to partition S we compute its contribu-
tion to the metric in exactly the same way as outlined
above for jSj ¼ 1. This means that given the functionality
for jSj ¼ 1 above, we retain functionality for jSj[ 1 as
nodes s are added:
rdðS0;VÞ ¼ rdðS [ fsg;VÞ ¼ 1
2

P
v2S rðvÞ
jSj  ðjV j þ 1Þ þ
rðsÞ
jVj þ 1
 
¼ 1
2

P
v2S rðvÞ þ rðsÞ
ðjSj þ 1Þ  ðjV j þ 1Þ
¼ 1
2

P
v2S[fsg rðvÞ
ðjSj þ jfsgjÞ  ðjVj þ 1Þ ¼
1
2

P
v2S0 rðvÞ
jS0j  ðjVj þ 1Þ :
h
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